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ABSTRACT
Social media data is changing the face of civil discovery in many cases,
and informal discovery of social media content on sites such as Facebook can
prove extremely valuable for litigants. But the process of performing infor-
mal searches of social media content tests the boundaries of ethics rules,
particularly those dealing with misrepresentation. Social media websites
shield some content from public view, and lawyers may run afoul of the
ethics rules if they use improper tactics to gain access to private information.
This essay explores the current ethical boundaries of informal discovery
as they apply to the social media data of unrepresented persons in particular.
It addresses how informal searches of social media are not only permitted,
but are required in some cases. Further, this essay suggests that the proper
approach to avoiding misrepresentation is to require affirmative disclosures
when attempting to access private online content in informal discovery. Such
disclosures are supported by the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and by the need to safeguard against abuses because of
the casual and informal nature of social media.
Assistant Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. I would like to thank
the SMU Science and Technology Law Review for inviting me to participate in
the Social Media Law Symposium and to contribute to this symposium issue.
Additionally, I'd like to thank my co-participants Mary Margaret Penrose,
Lyrissa Lidsky, Donald Flanary, Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Benjamin Cooper,
Judge Gena Slaughter, and Jan Jacobowitz, with special thanks to John G.
Browning for his collaborative spirit and tireless support (and for teaching me
the proper, Texan pronunciation of "voir dire").
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I. INTRODUCTION
The digital age has revolutionized how we communicate online, and one
of the most profound developments is the growth of social media. Social
media platforms like Facebook and Twitter are a major part of daily life for
many people. These social media websites catalogue detailed personal infor-
mation-including one's associations, physical activities, thoughts, and feel-
ings-and allow users to share these intimate details with a selected
audience. Naturally, social media has piqued the interest of litigators and
many include social media research as part of their case investigation and
discovery. Yet little guidance exists as to the ethical duties-and limita-
tions-that govern informal social media investigation. Although the ethics
rules allow lawyers to search public social media content, social media web-
sites create the risk of "one-click" ethics violations once lawyers attempt to
gain access to privacy-setting protected portions of a social media account.
This essay focuses on the ethical boundaries of informal discovery of
social media data, particularly lawyers' attempts to gain access to private
content of unrepresented persons. First, the ethics rules should be read to
require social media searches as part of the duty of competence in many
cases. Second, the Model Rules prohibit pretextual or "fake" profiles as a
means of tricking the social media user into granting private access. But ju-
risdictions are mixed as to whether "truthful" requests-those that properly
identify the lawyer-require an additional disclosure as to the purpose of the
request.' This essay concludes that even truthful requests for private access
may violate the Model Rules' prohibition against misrepresentation, absent
further disclosures. This conclusion is supported by the protections against
deceit embodied in the Model Rules and the informal, casual nature of social
media itself. Even though social media users must be diligent in screening
private access requests, the platform itself implies disinterest and amplifies
the ability to deceive. Thus, additional disclosures should be required under
the Model Rules.
II. INFORMAL DISCOVERY OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Informal discovery is a major part of civil litigation, and lawyers have
long recognized the benefits of informal fact research. Many courts favor it
1. See, e.g., John G. Browning, Facebook, Twitter, and Linkedin - Oh My! The
ABA Ethics 20/20 Commission and Evolving Ethical Issues in the Use of Social
Media, 40 N. Ky. L. REV. 255, 259 (2013); see generally Hope A. Comisky &
William M. Taylor, Don't Be a Twit: Avoiding the Ethical Pitfalls Facing Law-
yers Utilizing Social Media In Three Important Areas - Discovery, Communi-
cations with Judges and Jurors, and Marketing, 20 TEMP. POL & Civ. RTS. L.
REv. 297 (2011); see generally Jan L. Jacobowitz & Danielle Singer, The So-
cial Media Frontier: Exploring A New Mandate for Competence in the Prac-
tice of Law, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445 (2014).
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as an affordable and effective pretrial tool.2 These informal discovery tools
include observing public movements, interviewing witnesses, searching
records, and performing web searches before resorting to formal discovery.3
The means of employing many of these tools now exist for free, through
social media.4 Because social media websites compile and aggregate personal
data, they not only increase the scope of information that may be available
about litigants and witnesses, but also make it cheap and easy to access.
At least some social media content can be gathered by informal searches
because portions of social media accounts are public.5 But the ethical bound-
aries of informal social media discovery have yet to be clearly defined. In
particular, clarity is needed as to the duty to affirmatively search social media
and to avoid using misleading or deceptive conduct to gain access to private
social media content.
A. Social Media's Public/Private Distinction
In the last decade, the internet has morphed into an interactive, user-
driven platform that enables individuals to create and manage their own con-
tent.6 This shift is significant because individuals now have an easy way to
create an online identity, which often includes substantial amounts of per-
sonal information. Sites like Facebook and Twitter maintain a comprehensive
archive of the accountholder's thoughts, feelings, actions, and associations.7
When users join a social media site, they create their own page or profile by
inputting varying levels of personal data into a web form. This information
2. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947); see, e.g., Niesig v. Team I,
558 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (N.Y. 1990) (emphasizing policies favoring informal
discovery in line with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26-36).
3. See Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1034; Comisky & Taylor, supra note 2.
4. See John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of
Evidence from Social Media Sites, 14 SMU Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 466-68
(2011).
5. See, e.g., Profile & Timeline Privacy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/393920637330807 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (Facebook allows users to
set their privacy settings so that only approved "Friends" can see private con-
tent. Further, inline audience selectors allow the user to select a subgroup of
Friends for an individual post); see also Linkedin Help Center: Controlling
Who Sees Your Connections List, LINKEDIN, http://help.linkedin.com/app/an
swers/detail/a_id/52 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015); New User FAQs, TwITrER,
https://support.twitter.com/groups/50-welcome-to-twitter/topics/203-faqs/arti
cles/13920-new-user-faqs (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (By default, Twitter ac-
counts are public, but private account options also exist).
6. See, e.g., KRISHNA SANKAR & SUSAN A. BOUCHARD, ENTERPRISE WEB 2.0
FUNDAMENTALS 4, 5 (2009) (describing origins of an interactive internet).
7. See Get Started: Facebook Help Center, FACEBOOK, https:/www.facebook.
com/help/467610326601639 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (providing instructions
and features of Timeline).
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can include hometown, employment information, date of birth, relationship
status, political views, and even religious beliefs.8 Additionally, users can
post regular updates on their own page or on others' pages, including videos,
photos, links, or comments. 9 Geolocating features may track the physical lo-
cations users have visited, including events they have attended.o Social
reader apps may display the news articles they read and links they share.],
Many social media sites contain another unique feature: user-controlled
privacy settings.12 With privacy settings, users can make some content pub-
lic, so that it is visible to anyone who accesses the site.'3 Content the user
makes "private," on the other hand, is visible only to a smaller group of
approved users. 14
The fact that some social media content is shielded from public view
creates an ethical dilemma for lawyers engaging in informal discovery. At-
tempts to gain private access to social media content may result in some sort
of notification being sent to a target user.15 For example, Facebook requires a
user to send a "Friend" request to another user before granting private access,
which the user can then accept or reject.16 Twitter and Facebook have a "Fol-
low" feature that allows a user to receive public updates from another user's
account.' 7 "Friend" and "Follow" requests trigger a notice to the target user.18
Thus, even simple clicks can result in a form of communication, and that
communication may contain little or no identifying information about the
sender or about the purpose of the communication.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Facebook Locations: Location Basics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.
com/help/337244676357509 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (describing the addition
of story locations to maps).
11. See Mark Myerson, 10 Smart Social Reading and News Apps, ANDROID APP-
STORM (Dec. 26, 2013), http://android.appstorm.net/roundups/lifestyle-round
ups/I 0-smart-social-reading-and-news-apps.





17. See FAQs About Following, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/
14019-faqs-about-following (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
18. See id. (This notification may be sent via email, appear as a pop-up mobile
message, and display on the target user's Twitter page under "Followers" or
"Connect.").
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B. Duty to Search Social Media
While some lawyers seem to recognize the enormous value of perform-
ing informal searches for social media content, others seem to avoid social
media altogether, likely in an effort to prevent ethical missteps. Ironically,
avoidance may be an ethical misstep. The ethics rules are evolving to affirm-
atively require informal discovery of social media in many cases.
Take for example a lawyer who refuses to learn about social media and
improperly blocks discovery of his own client's Facebook information. In
this example, the lawyer represents a plaintiff in a wrongful death suit and is
served with a Request for Production for any relevant content in the plain-
tiff's Facebook account. Defense counsel had performed informal searches of
social media content before sending the request. Thus, he has attached to the
request a photograph of the plaintiff drinking at a bar and wearing a lewd t-
shirt, which purportedly contradicts the plaintiff's claims that he's a grieving
widower.
Upon receiving the request and photo, the plaintiff's lawyer asks his
client how defense counsel obtained the picture. The plaintiff immediately
answers that he thinks the photo is a private Facebook photo and has no idea
how it got into defense counsel's hands. On this information, the plaintiffs
lawyer opposes the discovery attempts and in a motion for protective order
before the court accuses defense counsel of "hacking" his client's Facebook
page. In reality, defense counsel found the photo through a simple search of
public Facebook information and has every right to seek other relevant social
media content in formal discovery. As a result, the court sanctions the plain-
tiff's lawyer for making baseless "hacking" accusations in his motion and for
failing to educate himself about how Facebook works. Additionally, the court
notes that plaintiffs lawyer had a duty to independently investigate facts and
law, but instead relied too heavily on his client's incomplete understanding
of the circumstances. Ultimately, the plaintiff's lawyer has to pay for failing
to understand the relevant technology before he made baseless hacking alle-
gations and for refusing to comply with valid discovery requests for social
media content.19
In the example above, the plaintiff's lawyer had an affirmative duty to
understand social media and its relevance to the matter. By avoiding social
media altogether, or by failing to learn about it when needed, he violated his
ethical duties and failed to serve his client's interests.
The ethics rules contemplate knowledge of relevant technology as part
of a lawyer's duty of competence. 20 Lawyers cannot ignore social media, and
the ethics rules and advisory opinions to date make clear that searching for
19. See generally Lester v. Allied Concrete Co., 80 Va. Cir. 454 (Va. Cir. Ct.
2010), aff'd 285 Va. 295 (2013) (The example is loosely based on this case).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2013).
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public social media content is not only permitted, but may even be required
under some circumstances.21
Further, nothing in the Model Rules prohibits searches of public social
media content. According to the New York State Bar Association, a lawyer
may access public social media content to find impeachment or other evi-
dence in pending litigation.22 Specifically, the ethics rules allow attorneys to
access content available to any member of the network that does not necessi-
tate a special relationship.23 Similarly, the Oregon Bar Association expressly
permits discovery of public social media searches in informal discovery,
analogizing public social media content to a magazine or book written by the
adversary or witness.24 That advisory opinion also notes that public searches
are permissible as to any person, including adversaries in litigation and trans-
actional matters. 25
Although, to date, no cases create an affirmative requirement to search
public social media profiles in informal discovery, other cases make clear
that online factual research may be required.26 Several ethics rules and Fed-
eral Rule 11 support the use of online factual research, like that performed on
a social media site, as part of the attorney's duty.27
Lawyers should assume they have an affirmative duty to include public
social media searches in some civil cases. First, ABA Model Rule 1.1 re-
quires lawyers to provide competent representation, which includes thor-
21. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 843 (2010), available at http://www.nys
ba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.
cfm&CONTENTID=43208. But see The Sedona Conference, Primer on Social
Media, 36 (Oct. 2012) (on file with author), available at https://thesedonacon
ference.org/publication/Primer%20on%2OSocial%20Media (suggesting that
collecting data on public portions of social media pages for use in litigation
may violate the website's terms of use).




24. See Or. Bar Ass'n., Formal Op. 2013-189, 577 (2013), available at https://
www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/2013-189.pdf.
25. Id. at 578 n.2 (The opinion also permits social media searches as to jurors, but
cautions against communicating or making any contact with jurors via social
media. Further, the no-contact rule contains an "observation" exception.); see,
e.g., Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 876 (N.D. I11. 2002); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2013) ("Observing versus Commu-
nication" annotation); State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden, 451
S.E.2d 721, 730 (W. Va. 1994).
26. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947); see, e.g., Niesig v. Team I,
558 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (N.Y. 1990) (emphasizing policies favoring informal
discovery in line with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26-36).
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2013).
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oughness and preparation.28 This duty encompasses technological proficiency
as well.29 The American Bar Association recently amended the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct to address the challenges of technology and the
globalization of the legal profession,30 but concluded that no specific revi-
sions were needed to address technology.3' Specifically, the Commission on
Ethics 20/20, formed in 2009 to modernize the ABA Model Rules in light of
"advances in technology and global legal practice," contemplated the chang-
ing ways technology is being used in case investigation and research.32 Ac-
knowledging that electronic discovery permeates modern litigation, the
Commission expressly noted that lawyers must "have a firm grasp on how
electronic information is created, stored, and retrieved" and are expected to
"advise their clients regarding electronic discovery obligations."33
However, the rules themselves contain no express language addressing
new technology. Instead, Model Rule 1.1 contains only one new comment
stating "a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice,
including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology .... "34
Notably, this comment is the first and only time technology is expressly in-
cluded within the scope of one's duty of competence under the Model Rules.
But the Commission otherwise refrained from making any substantive addi-
tions relating to the technological proficiency or the use of technology in
civil discovery.35 Nonetheless, this comment, adopted by the Ethics 20/20
28. See id. at cmt. 5.
29. See id. at cmt. 8.
30. See ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility: ABA Commission on Ethics
20/20, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/aba-
commission on ethics_20_20.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
31. See Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs ABA
Comm'n on Ethics 20/20 to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Ass'ns (state, local,




32. Id.; see also ABA, supra note 30.
33. See ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, Commission Report, ABA Commission
Ethics 20/20: Introduction and Overview, at 3-4 (Aug. 2012), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120508
_ethics_20_20_finalhodintrodutionand-overview-report.authcheckdam.pdf
(Specifically, revisions to the Model Rules considered two major trends: first,
the fundamental changes to how lawyers practice due to new technology tools
and the disaggregation of legal services and, second, globalization of legal
practice including issues with outsourcing and lawyer mobility.).
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2013) (emphasis added).
35. Gorelick & Traynor, supra note 31 ("In general, we have found that the princi-
ples underlying our current Model Rules are applicable to these new develop-
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Commission, signals an important shift towards recognizing the need for
technological proficiency among lawyers. 36 It highlights the fact that ethical
issues surrounding technology cannot be ignored.
Second, Model Rule 1.3 requires zealous representation and diligence,
including factual investigation.37 The degree of investigation necessary is
based on the specific circumstances of each case.38 Yet the duty of compe-
tence requires an attorney to at least "discover[ ] and present readily availa-
ble evidence." 39
Third, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II also imposes a duty of ade-
quate factual investigation. In particular, litigants must avoid filing frivolous
claims. Rule 11 requires attorneys to ascertain the facts underlying the case
and requires them to sign all pleadings, representing that factual assertions
are or will be supported after further discovery.40 Although this representa-
tion does not require factual or evidentiary support for all claims, 4 1 it does
signify that the attorney performed "an appropriate investigation into the
facts that is reasonable under the circumstances."42 Similarly, under Model
Rule 3.1, attorneys must make reasonable efforts to investigate claims before
ments. As a result, many of our recommendations involve clarifications and
expansions of existing Rules and policies rather than an overhaul. In sum, our
goal has been to apply the core values of the profession to 21st century
challenges.").
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2013); see also Steven S.
Gensler, Special Rules for Social Media Discovery?, 65 ARK. L. REV. 7, 33-34
(2012).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. d (2000) (duty of diligence encom-
passes "appropriate factual research").
38. For example, an attorney facing a statute of limitation may avoid sanctions
because no time remained for further investigation. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lib-
erty Lloyds, 672 So. 2d 268, 273 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
39. People v. Boyle, 942 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1997) (emphasis added) (attorney disci-
plined for not adequately preparing for hearing on asylum petition when he
"failed to discover and present readily available evidence").
40. FED. R. Civ. P. ll(b)(3).
41. See FED. R. Clv. P. 11, (b)-(c) advisory committee's notes (1993).
42. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, applying a state law similar to Federal Rule
11, identified some of the factors considered: "whether the signer of the docu-
ments had sufficient time for investigation; the extent to which the attorney had
to rely on his or other client for the factual foundation underlying the pleading,
motion or other paper; whether the case was accepted from another attorney;
the complexity of the facts and the attorney's ability to do a sufficient pre-filing
investigation and whether discovery would have been beneficial to the develop-
ment of the underlying facts." Wis. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Wis. Chiropractic
Examining Bd., 676 N.W.2d 580, 589 (Wisc. 2004).
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bringing any suit4 The duty of investigation is ongoing; attorneys must con-
sistently evaluate the facts and ensure that they have an adequate basis for
filing suit.44 Ethics violations may occur if the attorney knew, or should have
known, that factual or legal support was lacking for a claim.a5
When read together, these rules suggest that informal factual research is
a mandatory obligation for attorneys in many cases. Attorneys cannot hide
behind their ignorance of facts or law to avoid sanctions or discipline for a
violation of the rules. For example, in Hunt v. Dresie,46 an attorney faced
legal malpractice claims for failing to investigate the facts underlying a
breach of fiduciary duty claim.47 The Kansas Supreme Court held that clients
rightfully look to counsel to make a reasonable investigation into the facts
underlying a case.48 Therefore, the lawyer is obligated to search for the "true
facts," especially in cases where the litigants may be motivated by personal
animosity.4 9 Quite simply, it is the lawyer's role to objectively pursue facts
and provide advice premised on an adequate factual inquiry and analysis.50
Not only is factual research necessary to meet ethical obligations, online
factual research may also be required. Courts will not excuse a lawyer for
failing to locate simple facts that are readily available in an internet search.51
For example, in Weatherly v. Optimum Asset Management, Inc.,52 a Louisi-
ana court annulled a tax sale for failing to provide adequate notice after the
court performed its own internet search and quickly located the out-of-state
property owner. 53 Other courts have recognized a similar requirement to per-
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1; FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
44. In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 916 (Mo. 1997); Petrano v. Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 1:12-cv-86-SPM-GRJ, 2013 WL 1325201 (Feb. 4,
2013).
45. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Madison Area Technical Coll., 321 F.3d 652 (7th Cir.
2003) (attorney cannot rely on obviously fraudulent documents).
46. Hunt v. Dresie, 740 P.2d 1046 (Kan. 1987).
47. Id. at 1048.
48. Id. at 1054.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Some practitioner guides emphasize that, with the advent of e-discovery gener-
ally and social media specifically, attorneys are expected to maintain the neces-
sary level of technical knowledge for performing discovery and addressing
related legal issues. See, e.g., 121 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts §§ 18-19 (2011).
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form online research, almost a "duty to Google," and have not excused a
failure to locate readily available facts on the internet.54
Notably, at least one court has indicated social media searches may now
be part of one's duty of competence. In Griffin v. Maryland,55 a criminal
case, the court quoted a bar journal article with approval, stating "it should
now be a matter of professional competence for attorneys to take the time to
investigate social networking sites."56 The New Hampshire Bar Association
has also noted that the duty of diligence may include informal investigation
via social media.57 Several commentators argue that lawyers are now ex-
pected to look at the public portions of social media pages for impeachment
or other evidence in the course of litigation, even beyond cases in which
social media is the basis of a claim.58
Indeed, as noted in the "hacking" example above, courts will not excuse
lawyers from their duty of diligence just because the lawyer lacks social me-
dia familiarity. A Virginia state court in Lester v. Allied Concrete Co.59 sanc-
tioned an attorney under a state law equivalent to Federal Rule 11 after he
made baseless Facebook hacking accusations in relation to a motion to com-
pel discovery.60 The court noted that the lawyer cannot avoid his obligations
simply because he failed to familiarize himself with the relevant
technology.61
54. See Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (failure to
Google absent defendant demonstrates lack of diligence); Dubois v. Butler ex
rel. Butler, 901 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (attorney's use of
directory assistance as only attempt to locate missing defendant criticized by
court); see also Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 559 (Mo. 2010) (rec-
ognizing a duty to perform online research during the jury voir dire process).
55. Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010), rev'd on other
grounds, Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011) (overturned on grounds of
admissibility and authentication of MySpace page contents).
56. Id. at 801 (citing Seth P. Berman et. al., Web 2.0: What's Evidence Between
"Friends"?, BOSTON B.J., Jan./Feb. 2009, at 5, 6); Cannedy v. Adams, No. ED
CV 08-1230-CJC(E), 2009 WL 3711958, at *29 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2009) (fail-
ure by attorney to investigate social media evidence of victim recanting story
may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
57. See New Hampshire Bar Op. 2012-13/05.
58. See, e.g., Browning, Facebook, Twitter, and Linkedin, supra note 1; Cominsky
& Taylor, supra note 1; Jacobowitz & Singer, supra note 1.
59. Lester v. Allied Concrete Co., No. CL08-150, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 245 (Va.
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Last, formal discovery of social media content may also hinge on what
was found informally.62 Thus, a failure to check public social media content
may hinder the formal discovery process. Online research also is cost-effec-
tive and affordable, making it reasonable to require lawyers to do it.63 Mem-
bership is free for most social media websites and any user can search
publicly available content on the site.64 Thus, social media is an affordable
tool, costing only the time it takes to perform a search. As such, courts are
likely to consider it unreasonable to omit searching social media before filing
suit.
Therefore, lawyers are allowed to perform informal discovery searches
on social media, and may even be required to do so. But ethical boundaries
place limits on how far lawyers can go to gain access to social media content.
C. Duty to Avoid Misrepresentation Generally
Misrepresentation is a major risk when performing informal social me-
dia discovery. The Model Rules, when read together, impose an obligation of
fairness and create a general duty to avoid deceptive tactics when dealing
with litigants or third parties.65 They apply both in the litigation context and
in any attorney dealings with others, whether on the attorney's or the client's
behalf.66 At their core, the rules prevent dishonesty, which many identify as
62. See, e.g., Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010);
Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (courts
require the party seeking discovery to show how public content from the social
media account supports an argument that private data may be relevant too). For
a complete discussion of approaches courts take to formal discovery, see
Agnieszka McPeak, The Facebook Digital Footprint: Paving Fair and Consis-
tent Pathways to Civil Discovery of Social Media Data, 48 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 887, 903-07 (2013).
63. See, e.g., Wisc. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Wis. Chiropractic Examining Bd., 676
N.W.2d 580, 590 (Wisc. 2004).
64. See, e.g., LinkedIn Help Center, Linkedin Free and Upgraded Premium Ac-
counts, LINKEDIN, http://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a-id/71 (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2014).
65. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowers, 823
N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2012) (no-contact rule violated by sending direct email to
represented person); see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3-3.4,
4.1-4.4; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 cmt.
b (2000); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana Remus Irwin, Toward a Revised 4.2
No-Contact Rule, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 797, 803, 805-06 (2009) (discussing some
unclear or unjust applications of the no-contact rule).
66. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Robinson, 933 N.E.2d 1095, 1097 (Ohio
2010), reinstatement granted, 957 N.E.2d 295 (Ohio 2011) (Rule 3.4 applies to
both personal and professional conduct); In re Levin, 709 S.E.2d 808 (Ga.
2011), reinstatement granted, 744 S.E.2d 797 (Ga. 2011) (attorney who was
convicted of misdemeanor for distributing obscene material disciplined because
2014]
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the most detrimental trait a lawyer can have as it undermines the public trust
and perception of the profession.67
Informal discovery tactics may implicate at least four Model Rules.
First, Model Rule 4.1 requires truthfulness in statements to third parties in
the course of representing a client. 68 Second, Model Rule 4.3 specifically
applies to dealings with unrepresented persons and prohibits lawyers from
making misleading statements or implying disinterest.69 Third, Model Rule
8.4 prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct that involves "dishonesty,
fraud or deceit" in any context.70 Lastly, Model Rules 5.3 and 8.4 prohibit
lawyers from using third parties to perform tasks on their behalf that would
otherwise amount to a rule violation.71
The rules, therefore, prohibit dishonesty in the form of affirmative, mis-
leading statements as well as concealing the truth or omitting material infor-
mation. As to affirmative statements, lawyers cannot use "pretexting," which
is misrepresentation or deception to gain access to facts.72 For example, an
attorney may not pose as someone else to gather information. In In Re Con-
crime goes to his moral turpitude and fitness to practice law); Lawyer Discipli-
nary Bd. v. Markins, 663 S.E.2d 614 (W. Va. 2008) (lawyer disciplined for
unauthorized access to wife's email and those of others at her law firm, even
though reasons for doing so were personal and not related to client).
67. See, e.g., In re Kalil's Case, 773 A.2d 647, 648 (N.H. 2001) ("no single trans-
gression reflects more negatively on the legal profession than a lie"). In addi-
tion to the Model Rules, other legal ethics rules prohibit dishonest conduct. For
example, Federal Rule II requires that all papers signed by the lawyer are well
grounded in fact and law, a rule that necessarily prohibits dishonesty and de-
ception by the lawyer. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1.
69. Id. R. 4.3.
70. See id. R. 8.4.
71. Id. R. 5.3(c), R. 8.4(a). Other Model Rules also encompass duties of honesty,
including Candor to the Tribunal (R. 3.3), Fairness to Opposing Party and
Counsel (R. 3.4), Advertising Legal Services (R. 7.2), and Responsibilities of a
Partner or Supervisory Lawyer (R. 5.1).
72. See Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int'l Collectors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 474-75
(D.N.J. 1998) (pretexting involves concealing one's true identity to gather in-
formation); Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
577, 578 (2005) (referring to "surreptitious discovery" and "covert investiga-
tions"); David J. Dance, Pretexting: A Necessary Means to a Necessary End?,
56 DRAKE L. REV. 791, 792 (2008) (noting that pretexting is defined as using
deception to gather private facts); David B. Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethi-
cal Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Undercover Investigators and
Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisions Prohibiting Misrepre-
sentation Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 791, 792-93 (1995) (pretexting described as using misrepresentations
about one's identity in order to obtain facts).
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duct of Gatti, the Oregon Supreme Court disciplined an attorney who posed
as a doctor in phone conversations to obtain facts pertaining to an anticipated
lawsuit by his client.73 Similarly, the South Carolina Supreme Court disci-
plined an attorney for posing as the cousin of an injured driver in a phone call
with a potential party to a personal injury suit.74 In that instance, Model Rule
8.4 was violated because the attorney failed to put the party on notice of the
"adversarial nature of the conversation."75
Additionally, misrepresentation may occur by mere omission. Under
Model Rule 4.1, "[m]isrepresentations can also occur by partially true but
misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative
false statements."76 Further, under Model Rule 4.3, lawyers cannot imply
they are disinterested in dealings with unrepresented persons.7 7 Thus, if law-
yers know or should know that the party misunderstands the lawyers' role or
purpose, they have a duty to correct that misunderstanding.78 Comment one
to this rule makes it clear that lawyers may need to make affirmative disclo-
sures about their intent and purpose in certain circumstances: "In order to
avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the law-
yer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests op-
posed to those of the unrepresented person."79 Moreover, half-truths, silence,
or non-disclosure of material facts also may amount to misrepresentation.80
73. In re Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 970 (Or. 2000) (Gatti posed as a doctor and
conducted a phone interview with one chiropractor and called the vice presi-
dent of a medical review company implying that he was a doctor interested in
working with the company. He surreptitiously recorded both phone calls); see
also Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc.; 347 F.3d 693 (8th Cir.
2003); People v. Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002).
74. In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 322 S.E.2d 667, 669 (S.C. 1984).
75. Id.
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1. Notably, Model Rule 4.1's require-
ment of truthfulness in statement to others does not extend to all factual state-
ments to opposing counsel. Id. R. 4.1 cmt. 1.
77. Id. R. 4.3.
78. Id.
79. Id. R. 4.3 cmt. 1.
80. In re Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d at 973 (internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Ky.
Bar Ass'n v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997) (lawyer disciplined because
he failed to disclose to opposing party the fact that his client died); see also
Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Visser, 629 N.W.2d
376, 383 (Iowa 2001) (attorney disciplined for making half-true statement to
press about court ruling because a half-truth still amounts to a misleading state-
ment). Other courts have also held that misleading conduct need not be willful
or intentional to violate the Model Rules. Rather, dishonesty can result simply
from not being straightforward about facts. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v.
McCord, 905 N.E.2d 1182, 1188 (Ohio 2009) (stating "the only relevant con-
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Nonetheless, courts and state ethics committees have carved out three
major exceptions to the rules prohibiting misrepresentation. First, govern-
ment lawyers may be allowed to use covert investigations and pretexting
under the rationale that government lawyers serve the public good and have a
duty to advance the public interest.81 Second, covert investigations may be
permitted when they are likely to expose unlawful activities that otherwise go
undetected.82 Third, certain types of cases allow for undercover operations,
such as trademark cases, cases where investigators pose as customers of pub-
lic businesses,83 or housing or employment discrimination cases that use un-
disclosed discrimination testers.84 Even though all three of these exceptions
implicate dishonesty under the Model Rules, courts permit such covert
activities.85
sideration is whether respondent performed the unethical acts; his subjective
intent in doing so does not change the analysis"); Ansell v. Statewide Griev-
ance Comm., 865 A.2d 1215 (2005) (intent not required in order to find unethi-
cal misleading conduct); Attorney Grievance Com'n of Md. v. Reinhardt, 892
A.2d 533, 540 (Md. 2006). In Reinhardt, a lawyer was disciplined for telling
his client he is working on the case, when in fact he lost the file. The court
stated that, "[i]n dealing with his client, respondent exhibited a lack of probity,
integrity and straightforwardness, and, therefore, his actions were dishonest in
that sense." Id.
81. See, e.g., Gerald B. Lefcourt, Fighting Fire with Fire: Private Attorneys Using
the Same Investigative Techniques As Government Attorneys: The Ethical and
Legal Considerations for Attorneys Conducting Investigations, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 397, 398 (2007). Notably, commentators question the rationale for per-
mitting greater deception by government lawyers over private ones. See, e.g.,
Barry Temkin, Deception in Undercover Investigations: Conduct Based vs.
Status Based Ethical Analysis, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 123 (2008); Isbell &
Salvi, supra note 72, at 804-05 (ethics rules on misrepresentation should not
turn on the perceived worthiness of the lawyer's goal or on the mere distinction
between private and public lawyers).
82. See, e.g., OR. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(D) (2002); see N.Y.
Cnty. Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Formal Op. 737, at 6 (2007),
available at http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications519_0.
pdf; see also Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119,
126 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int'l Collectors Soc., 15 F. Supp. 2d
456, 475 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding the use of private investigators to discovery
violations of the law is generally permitted).
83. See, e.g., Apple Corps, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 456.
84. See Isbell & Salvi, supra note 72, at 793.
85. Id. (noting that discrimination testers are generally acceptable because courts
have widely accepted them by both private and public lawyers, the testers en-
gage in no illegal tactics, enforcement of the law is a noble goal, and testers
may detect violations that may otherwise evade discovery).
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Lastly, Model Rules 5.3 and 8.4 prohibit a lawyer from using a third
party to violate the legal ethics rules.86 Thus, the analysis regarding acts of
deception applies regardless of whether the actor is a lawyer or someone
acting for a lawyer. However, a lawyer is not responsible for the acts of third
parties hired by a client or otherwise not acting at the behest of the lawyer.87
In sum, the Model Rules limit a lawyer's tactics in informal discovery
by prohibiting deceptive and misleading conduct in the form of affirmative
misrepresentations or, in some instances, omissions.
D. Misrepresentation in Attempts to Access Private Social Media
Content
Although lawyers should, as a matter of professional competence,
search social media during informal discovery in many cases, these searches
can violate ethics rules if lawyers make false statements or engage in deceit-
ful and misleading conduct. Attorneys viewing public profiles may be
tempted to seek access to the private portions of a social media page, know-
ing that the user is shielding some content behind self-selected privacy set-
tings. This temptation is even greater when the user has hundreds of
"Friends" and likely gives little consideration before accepting a "Friend"
request.
For example, a defendant's lawyer searches Facebook for facts that may
help his client's tort suit. He locates a Facebook page for one of plaintiff's
key witnesses, a young woman who has direct knowledge about the underly-
ing incident. On the public portions of the Facebook page, the lawyer sees
pictures of the witness at parties and notices comments about how she drinks
heavily and has alcohol-related memory loss on occasion. The lawyer also
notices that the witness has over 900 Facebook friends and likely gives little
thought to what requests she accepts.
Intrigued by what useful information may exist in the private portions of
the witness's Facebook page, the lawyer considers his options for obtaining
that content. First, he knows enough about the witness from her public
Facebook content to glean the types of Friend requests she generally accepts.
The lawyer believes he could create a fake profile that matches a lot of the
witness's biographical data, such as hometown, high school, and favorite
places. With these details, the lawyer could easily craft a fake profile that
would lure the witness into accepting the request.
Alternatively, the lawyer thinks the witness might accept a request using
the lawyer's real name. After all, the lawyer is from a nearby town and is not
much older than the witness. The lawyer also likes a lot of the same restau-
rants and sports teams as the witness. Nothing on the lawyer's Facebook
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(c), R.8.4(a) (2013); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (Similarly, a supervising attorney is respon-
sible for the actions of junior attorneys and paralegals).
87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 1 (2013).
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page indicates that he is a lawyer representing the defendant in the pending
case. Perhaps his truthful biographical data would be enough to lure the wit-
ness into accepting the request, provided that the witness does not ask for
more information, and fails to Google the lawyer's name to deduce his pro-
fession and relationship to the defendant or the pending case. At the very
least, the lawyer believes he could get the witness to accept a fake or truthful
request sent by his private investigator or his paralegal.
As the above example illustrates, there are three different approaches for
attempting to gain access to private social media content by informal discov-
ery means: (1) fake profiles to gain access, (2) truthful requests for access,
and (3) access through third parties. All three of these approaches may be
unethical under existing state or local bar opinions interpreting the Model
Rules.
i. Fake Profiles to Gain Access
First, creating a fake profile to gain access to private content is generally
forbidden.88 Attorneys may be tempted to create fake online identities by
mimicking the user's interests and background. This task is simple to accom-
plish when the user leaves certain information public, such as hometown,
schools attended, and interests. From the user's public data, an attorney could
create a fake profile that increases the likelihood that the user will accept the
request. But doing so is an unethical use of pretexting.89
Pretexting violates the Model Rules that prohibit false statements or de-
ceitful or misleading conduct because the lawyer is resorting to trickery to
infiltrate a private social media page.90 Several ethics opinions already ex-
pressly prohibit pretextual requests for private access to social media content.
For example, the New York City Bar Association forbids such activity under
New York's version of Model Rule 8.4, which bans conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.91 The Oregon, San Diego, New
88. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c).
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, Ethics of "Pretexting " in a Cyber World, 41 Mc-
GEORGE L. REV. 271, 272 (2010). Fake profiles may also violate the social
media site's use terms, which may even lead to civil or criminal liability. See,
e.g., Paul F. Wellborn III, "Undercover Teachers" Beware: How That Fake
Profile on Facebook Could Land You in the Pokey, 63 MERCER L. REV. 697,
713 (2012) (noting how fake profiles can lead to liability under computer fraud
or anti-trespass statutes). Additionally, the Model Rules prohibits violations
against the third party's legal rights. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
4.4(a); Jeannette Braun, A Lose-Lose Situation: Analyzing the Implications of
Investigatory Pretexting Under the Rules of Professional Responsibility, 61
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 355, 358 (2010).
91. N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2010-2 (2010), http://www2.nycbar.org/Ethics/
eth20lO.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
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Hampshire, and Philadelphia Bar Associations also expressly prohibit pretex-
tual requests.92
Deceptive tactics to gain access to social media content are particularly
abusive given the nature of social media. Although social media mimics real-
world interactions in many ways, it differs from in-person or other communi-
cation because of its casual and informal nature.93 Social media users may
give less thought to permitting access to private content online than they
would, for example, in a face-to-face meeting or phone call. Because decep-
tion via social media is easier to achieve than in other real-world scenarios, a
lawyer's pretextual request unfairly capitalizes on the casual and informal
nature of social media.94 As a result, the ethics opinions correctly interpret
the Model Rules as prohibiting lawyers from creating fake profiles or other-
wise engaging in pretextual conduct or deceit to trick a user into accepting a
private access request. Thus, lawyers cannot use fake profiles as an informal
discovery tactic.
ii. The Lawyer's Direct Request
The second approach involves a truthful request that the lawyer sends
using the lawyer's real name and biographical data. Even though these re-
quests avoid outright pretexting, the Model Rules should nonetheless prohibit
truthful requests when, upon sending the request, the lawyer fails to affirma-
tively disclose the request's purpose and nature.
Bar Associations that have addressed the ethics of direct requests disa-
gree as to whether additional disclosures should be required. Some advisory
opinions state that truthful, direct requests that have no affirmative misrepre-
sentation are permitted.95 Others maintain that even truthful requests that
give no further disclosure as to their purpose are deceptive because they con-
tain a material misrepresentation.96 Apart from the fact that requiring further
disclosures is the soundest approach, the existing Model Rules support it.
However, the New York City and Oregon Bar Associations permit di-
rect requests without disclosures at all. In an advisory opinion, the New York
92. Or. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2013-189 (2013), https://www.osbar.org/_docs/eth-
ics/2013-189.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2015); see also N.H. Bar Ass'n Ethics
Comm., Advisory Op. 2012-13/05 (2012).
93. See Bennett, supra note 90.
94. For example, Facebook's terms of use require that account holders use "the
names they use in real life." Not only do fake profiles violate this policy,
Facebook users may be less likely to question profiles that appear legitimate on
their face. See Facebook's Name Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.
com/help/292517374180078 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
95. See, e.g., Or. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2013-189 (2013); N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, For-
mal Op. 2010-2 (2010).
96. See, e.g., San Diego Bar Ass'n, Legal Ethics Op. 2011-2 (2011); Phila. Bar
Ass'n, Prof'l Guidance Comm. Op. 2009-02 (2009).
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City Bar Association noted that pretexting is prohibited, but that truthful re-
quests to unrepresented persons are legitimate, informal discovery tactics.97
The Oregon Bar also permits truthful requests without disclosures: "A simple
request to access nonpublic information does not imply that Lawyer is 'disin-
terested' in the pending legal matter. On the contrary, it suggests that Lawyer
is interested in the person's social networking information, although for an
unidentified purpose."98
Under the Oregon approach, the account holder needs to be diligent
before accepting requests by inquiring about the request's purpose. 99 None-
theless, the lawyer has a duty to correct any misunderstanding the user might
have as to the lawyer's purpose or role: "[I]f the holder of the account asks
for additional information to identify Lawyer, or if Lawyer has some other
reason to believe that the person misunderstands her role, Lawyer must pro-
vide the additional information or withdraw the request."0 Thus, the lawyer
is still responsible for preventing the account holder from operating under a
false impression, a standard that may be difficult to apply in the social media
context.
By contrast, at least three bar associations expressly require the request-
ing lawyer's affirmative disclosures. For example, a Philadelphia Bar Associ-
ation opinion notes that a direct request to a witness may still omit a key
material fact: that the requesting party is seeking evidence to use in pending
or potential litigation.OI Thus, even when the lawyer makes direct requests,
this opinion seems to require an additional statement disclosing the lawyer's
role and intent.102 Similarly, the San Diego Bar Association expressly prohib-
its lawyers' direct requests that fail to disclose the request's purpose and
intent. In its advisory opinion, the San Diego Bar Association interpreted
various California legal principles that create an affirmative duty not to
deceive that is similar to the Model Rules' duty.103 Citing with approval to
the Philadelphia Bar Association opinion, the San Diego Bar Association
concluded that "[e]ven where an attorney may overcome other ethical objec-
tions to sending a friend request, the attorney should not send such a request
to someone involved in the matter for which he has been retained without
97. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2010-2, at 4.
98. Or. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2013-189, at 580.
99. Id.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. See Phila. Bar Ass'n, Prof I Guidance Comm. Op. 2009-02 (discussing truthful
requests by third parties who are associated with the lawyer, but fail to disclose
their association when making the request); see also N.H. Bar Ass'n Ethics
Comm., Advisory Op. 2012-13/05 (2012).
102. See Phila. Bar Ass'n, Prof'l Guidance Comm. Op. 2009-02.
103. See San Diego Bar Ass'n, Legal Ethics Op. 2011-2.
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disclosing his affiliation and the purpose for the request."104 Thus, the law-
yer's direct requests-without further disclosures-still amount to deceitful
and misleading conduct. Similarly, in New Hampshire, lawyers can only
send a request for private access to a social media user if "the request identi-
fies the lawyer by name as a lawyer and also identifies the client and the
matter in litigation. This information serves to correct any reasonable misim-
pression the witness might have regarding the role of the lawyer."105
In essence, the Philadelphia, San Diego, and New Hampshire Bar As-
sociations assume that a lawyer's requests for private access are misleading
on their own, thereby necessitating further disclosures. In contrast, the New
York City and Oregon Bar Associations assume that the requests are not
misleading since they disclose the lawyer's real name. Thus, the New York
City and Oregon Bar Associations place the onus of performing additional
research or inquiring into the request's purpose on the account holder, while
the Philadelphia, San Diego, and New Hampshire approach recognizes the
inherently misleading nature of such a request.
The soundest approach is the one taken in the Philadelphia, San Diego,
and New Hampshire advisory opinions. Even though the account holder
should be diligent when screening requests, lawyers should nonetheless be
required to include an affirmative disclosure. As noted in the New Hamp-
shire opinion, the affirmative disclosure should include the name of the law-
yer, the client, and the litigation. Social media as a platform invites casual
and informal interaction, but it fails to encourage careful scrutiny or research
before accepting a request.106 The request itself may contain few details from
which to glean the lawyer's real motive. Beyond that, the request may con-
tain very little, if any, identifiable biographical information. Thus, even if the
user can see the lawyer's real name, the request itself offers no information
about the lawyer's role in a particular case or the request's purpose.
Rather, a typical request may outwardly deceive the target user. In many
cases, the lawyer may live in the same city as the target user, root for the
same sports teams, frequent the same restaurants, know some of the same
people, or attend the same local events. Not only does the request ineffec-
tively inform the user about the lawyer's role, it might have the opposite
effect by creating a false sense of social connection. Because social media
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. N.H. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 2012-13/05 (2012).
106. For example, a friend request on Facebook contains minimal information and
provides little context for assessing its merit. Rather, the friend request simply
appears as a small profile photo with the requesting user's name. See Abram
Carolyn, How to Accept a Facebook Friend Request, FOR DUMMIES, http://
www.dummies.com/how-to/content/how-to-accept-a-friend-request-on-face
book.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (The friend request notification fails to
provide any other personal information about the requesting party. If users
click on the requesting lawyer's name before accepting a friend request, they
are taken to the lawyer's public Facebook page only).
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exists to promote social contact, the target user may simply assume that
shared interests prompted the request, as opposed to a drive to gather damag-
ing evidence to use against the target user in litigation. The casual request's
very nature implicates the caveat that the Oregon opinion notes by stating
that more information is necessary "if Lawyer has some other reason to be-
lieve that the person misunderstands her role."107 Any lawyer seeking private
access to an unrepresented person's social media page to gather information
to use in litigation should assume the target misunderstands the lawyer's in-
tent, purpose, and role.108 Thus, lawyers should be required to provide affirm-
ative disclosures with truthful social media access requests.
Further, other policies underlying the Model Rules support an affirma-
tive disclosure requirement. One of the reasons lawyers want to be exempt
from a disclosure requirement when requesting private access is because on
some level they fear that the target users would deny access if they knew the
request's real motive. This reasoning elevates zealous advocacy above the
lawyer's underlying obligations to be honest and to avoid trickery, thereby
circumventing the protections against deceit that the Model Rules prescribe.
Potential witnesses also must be put on notice of the importance of the con-
versation they are about to have with a lawyer.109 The notice requirement is
especially important in the social media context, as social media communica-
tions invite casual contact and provide no notice that an attorney is gathering
evidence to use in a court of law.
Lawyers should be encouraged to heed the barrier that the user creates
via user-selected privacy settings. Even though social media websites pro-
mote casual interaction, the mere fact that users give little thought to what
they share should not alter the Model Rules' meaning and purpose. While
107. Or. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2013-189 (2013).
108. Few commentators have addressed the lawyers' direct friend requests issue, but
those who have are inconsistent in their approaches. For example, some argue
that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 allows a direct friend request to
an unrepresented party because no outward misrepresentation is involved. See,
e.g., BRIAN SHANNON FAUGHNAN ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
LITIGATION 186 (2012). Instead, the account holder has to inquire into the re-
quest's purpose before accepting it. Id. Overall, however, commentators warn
that no court or disciplinary board has directly addressed the issue, and lawyers
who face it in practice must analyze the issue for themselves and weigh the
risks of an ethical violation or improper discovery tactic against the belief that
no deception is involved in direct friend requests. See id. at 187; Jaclyn S.
Millner & Gregory M. Duhl, Social Networking and Workers' Compensation
Law at the Crossroads, 31 PACE L. REV. 1, 38 (2011) (cautioning against direct
requests unless a jurisdiction recognizes and applies an exception to the mis-
representation rules); John G. Browning, Keep Your "Friends" Close and Your
Enemies Closer: Walking the Ethical Tightrope in the Use of Social Media, 3
ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 204, 231 (2013) (noting that social me-
dia as a platform makes deception easier than in-person contact).
109. See In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 322 S.E.2d 667, 669 (S.C. 1984).
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lawyers should be encouraged to conduct witness interviews and other infor-
mal discovery, lawyers' direct requests should contain additional disclosures
because the platform itself implies disinterest and permits users to be easily
misled.
iii. Access Through a Third Party
The last approach is obtaining private social media content through a
third party. While some third-party access is permitted, restrictions similar to
lawyers' truthful direct access requests may apply. For example, if the third
party is acting under the lawyer's direction, the same prohibitions on pretext-
ing and deception limit what the third party can do.lb0 Thus, a third party,
such as a private investigator or paralegal, cannot create a fake profile to
access private content under the attorney's instruction. Additionally, the third
party's direct requests should include express disclosures as to the request's
affiliation and purpose. The third party's request is even more likely to
deceive the target user because the third party's real name likely presents no
clue as to the requester's purpose, intent, or affiliation. Thus, the capacity to
mislead is even greater when seemingly unaffiliated non-lawyers send the
truthful request.
However, if the third party is not acting under the lawyer's direction,
fewer limitations exist. For example, clients are free to hire private investiga-
tors on their own initiative and pass on content to the lawyer. Additionally,
the ethics rules generally fail to bar lawyers from using the information that
the client may obtain."' If the client or a third party already has direct access
to the witness' private social media page, nothing likely prevents them from
forwarding private social media content to the lawyer.' 2
In sum, the ethics rules restrict each of the three ways by which lawyers
may attempt to gain access to private social media accounts. While pretext-
ing is generally prohibited, truthful requests are permitted but should be ac-
companied by affirmative disclosures. Further, third-party attempts initiated
at the lawyer's behest face the same ethical limits.
III. CONCLUSION
Lawyers have an affirmative duty to include social media in their dis-
covery plans, including in informal investigative steps. Failure to do so may
amount to an ethics violation. But lawyers may also violate ethics rules when
they attempt to access private social media content. Lawyers must refrain
from pretexting or misrepresentation, which can occur when the lawyer cre-
110. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2013).
111. See David H. Taylor, Should It Take a Thief?: Rethinking the Admission of
Illegally Obtained Evidence in Civil Cases, 22 REV. LirIG. 625, 629 (2003); see
also N.H. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 2012-13/05 (2012) ("no rule
prohibits the client from sharing with the lawyer information gained").
112. Browning, Keep Your "Friends" Close, supra note 108, at 231.
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ates a fake profile in an attempt to gain access to a user's private social media
account. Truthful requests also may run afoul of the ethics rules because they
lack adequate details to put the user on notice of the lawyer's role, affiliation,
and purpose. Even though users must be cautious in allowing access to their
private social media content, the social media interactions' casual and infor-
mal nature make it easier to deceive an unsuspecting user who receives a
lawyer's truthful request (or that of a third party acting at the lawyer's be-
hest). Quite simply, absent affirmative disclosures, misrepresentation still ex-
ists. Thus, to comply with the ethics rules, lawyers should accompany a
private access request with a statement about the lawyer's role and purpose.
With proper disclosure, lawyers can meet their obligations of competence
and diligence while also avoiding misrepresentation.
